Corporate incubators for technology development are a recent phenomenon whose functioning and implications are not yet well understood. The resource-based view can offer an explanatory model on how corporate incubators function as specialised corporate units that hatch new businesses. While tangible resources, such as the financial, physical and even explicit knowledge flow, are all visible, and therefore easy to measure, intangible resources such as tacit knowledge and branding flow are harder to detect and localise. Managing the resource flow requires the initial allocation of resources to the corporate incubator during its set-up as well as a continuous resource flow to the technology venture and, during the harvest phase, also from it. Two levels of analysis need to be distinguished: (1) the resource flow between the corporate incubator and the technology venture and (2) the resource flow interface between the corporate incubator and the technology venture. Our empirical findings are based on two phases: First, in-depth case studies of 22 companies through 47 semi-structured interviews that were conducted with managers of large technology-intensive corporations' corporate incubators in Europe and the U.S., and second, an analysis of the European Commission's benchmarking survey of 77 incubators.
Introduction

Rise and fall of incubators
While non-profit incubators have existed for a long time, for-profit corporate incubators have only recently emerged as a prominent organisational form of R&D management. An incubator is an entity that "hatches" new ideas by providing physical resources and support to nurture the growth of new business ventures, which can either be an independent start-up, or an internal corporate venture (Allen and McCluskey, 1990; Hansen et al., 2000a) . Non-profit incubators focus on providing support to start-ups by furthering local development and other community social purposes, while for-profit incubators concentrate on financial returns for the corporation. From 1998 to early 2000 the number of for-profit incubators increased substantially during a concurrent boom in venture capital. For example, in the U.S. the number of incubators rose to more than 900 from the 12 in 1980 (NBIA, 2000) . 1 Fuelled by new opportunities from the Internet boom, and venture capitalists and angel investors' increasing appetite for technology start-ups, independent incubators were quite successful between 1998 and 2000. With the market correction in early 2000, many independent incubators shrank, or disappeared along with venture capital funds. However, corporate incubators have increased in importance. They have learned from the rise and fall of independent incubators and have taken over some of their processes, mechanisms and instruments.
Despite many corporate incubators having survived the rise and fall of incubators, little research has been undertaken on the increasing empirical relevance of this recent phenomenon.
The proposed taxonomy ( Fig. 1 ) distinguishes between non-profit and for-profit incubators, which can be further differentiated by whether they are organised as independent organisations or are linked to a corporation. For-profit incubators focus on financial returns for their owners, or on corporate goals such as enhancing technology development, thus indirectly benefitting profitability. In the medium to long term, they achieve positive gains through service fees and equity stakes in new ventures. For-profit incubators include independent for-profit incubators as start-ups that aim to gain fast profits from other successful start-ups, or corporate incubators that want to extract value from their portfolio of technologies, or want to explore new technology for their core business.
However, some incubators might exhibit elements of more than one type. Overall incubators may vary in terms of their sponsor's motivation and objective, which ensure their continuous support by the sponsor, determine the type of services provided, the way they operate and the incubator staff's background and expertise, particularly that of the incubator manager.
Besides the first-order differentiation between non-profit and for-profit incubators, four types of incubators can be distinguished in a second-order in terms of their institutional sponsor, in other words, whether it is a governmental, nongovernmental, independent (start-up) or corporate incubator. This research focuses on the role of corporate incubators as strategic investments designed to develop technologies and partnerships benefitting the parent corporation, and ignores venture capital investment aims. While research on the nature of the relationship between the corporate incubator and the parent corporation, on the incubation process and on the resources provided has been limited, the relationship and interaction between new ventures and investors, such as venture capitalists and angel investors, have been extensively researched.
Corporate incubators are specialised corporate units that hatch new businesses and enhance a corporation's technology base to support its overall development and growth. The object of their support can be external or internal start-ups, or entrepreneurs with a promising business idea, or technology, which will be termed technology ventures hereafter. Often legally structured as a subsidiary of the parent holding firm, they draw on the whole corporation's resources to support either internal or external ventures. Corporate incubators realise technological options as part of an overall corporate mission and thus gain profits in the medium to long term. Being part of a larger corporation, corporate incubators have long-term strategic goals and take the fit with the parent corporation into account, but are also able to leverage the parent's resources.
The paper is structured as follows: After a literature review of the resource-based view as well as the resource flow in the incubation and corporate venturing literature, the tangible as well as intangible resources of for-profit corporate incubators are examined. This includes the resource flow between the corporate incubator and parent corporation as well as between the corporate incubator and the technology venture, based on quantitative findings as well as on examples of case studies. The paper concludes with a discussion of the resource allocation process as well as the quality and impact of the resource flow. Finally, suggestions for further research are forwarded.
Literature review of the resource-based view and corporate incubators
In this paper, we seek to link the resource-based view of the firm with an analysis of the resource flow from and to the corporate incubator. Resources are flexible assets that can be utilised to create value. We focus on resources for two reasons. First, corporate incubators can support the technology venture's development, thus substantially improving their resource constraint. Since start-ups lack resources and insights due to their short existence, one of the corporate incubator's central purposes is to bridge the physical as well as intangible resource and knowledge gaps. And, second, this resource flow can increase the new technology venture's chances of survival and growth.
The resource-based view
The resource-based view suggests that corporations can create a competitive advantage through the development and intelligent application of core resources and capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Hamel and Prahalad, 1990; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993) . Resources, as the basic unit of analysis, can be defined in generic terms as input into the production process through which the corporation can perform operations and thus create and extract streams of economic rent from its resources (Grant, 1991; Amit and Shoemaker, 1993; Black and Boal, 1994) . However, neither the existence of resources nor their random use is enough, since only by applying resources strategically can economic rents be created and extracted (Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1977; Nelson and Winter, 1982) . Large corporations should have extensive resources that are vital, and therefore core, if they are (at least partially) to meet four important conditions: the resource is valuable, rare, hard to imitate and cannot be easily substituted (Barney, 1991) .
Besides the resources' impact, a second stream of literature focuses on distinguishing the resources. Barney (1991) detected financial, physical, human and organisational resources, which Grant (1991) extended with two further factorstechnology resources and reputation. Also "invisible assets" are important and were introduced by Itami and Roehl (1987) as "information-based resources" such as management skills and experience, distribution control, corporate culture, consumer trust and brand image (see also classifications by Aaker (1989) and Hall (1992) . The management resource is of particular importance, but is an often-overlooked catalyst, because the corporation's managers and management team will recombine the firm's resources (Penrose, 1959; Aaker, 1989) .
The resource-based view distinguishes between resources as stocks (inputs) and capabilities as resource flows (Dierickx et al., 1989) , with the latter being the focus of this paper. Granovetter's (1973 Granovetter's ( , 1985 work on strong and weak ties described the strength and nature of relationships, which are important determinants of the resource flow. Due to the importance of the resource-based framework, the resource flow process of resources' creation and dissemination both to and from the corporate incubator needs to been analysed. The corporate incubator receives resources from the parent corporation during its initial set-up and, consequently, can continuously provide its portfolio companies, called technology ventures, with resources.
There is constant interaction between the three players -the parent corporation, corporate incubator and technology venture -involved in the corporate incubation process (see Fig. 2 ). The parent corporation initialises the corporate incubator through the provision of resources while, in turn, the corporate incubator accelerates the technology ventures' development by providing resources. The parent corporation is a complex organisation with various hierarchical levels, subsidiaries and partially controlled affiliates such as joint ventures or alliances. The flow of resources inside the corporation occurs between all parties through mutual exchange. Additionally, resources can come from external partners outside the corporation's boundaries such as suppliers, service providers and even competitors.
Understanding the resource flow requires two levels of analysis: (1) the resource flow between the corporate incubator and parent corporation and (2) the resource flow between the corporate incubator and the technology venture during the incubation's involvement phase. The resource flow outside the corporation to other parties was not included in the literature research. 
Resource flow between the corporate incubator and parent corporation
The incubator literature analyses the incubator's set-up and structure and the incubation process. In other words, how technology ventures such as start-ups can be supported, and, to a lesser degree since it is a relatively recent phenomenon, how resources flow from the parent corporation to the corporate incubator. However, the literature on corporate venturing and "intrapreneurship" (a term specific to entrepreneurship in large corporations) mostly focuses on how innovation can be enhanced (through active investment) using corporate funds in semi-autonomous units in large mature corporations (Burgelman, 1984; Pinchot, 1985; Hisrich, 1986; Vesper, 1990; Bitzer, 1991; Dyckerhoff, 1995) . It is emphasised that senior management should provide the rationale for business development, set up the venture's structure, authorise projects and monitor performance (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986) . One of the most important advantages of a corporate venture is its access to corporate resources such as capital, expertise, branding and networks. By comparing corporate ventures with independent entrepreneurial ventures, Shrader and Simon (1997) found that corporate ventures emphasise proprietary knowledge, marketing expertise and internal capital. Furthermore, the corporate venture can use the corporation's underutilised capacities and, therefore, realise economies of scale. For example, corporate ventures may tap the parent corporation's distribution and supply advantages, leveraging the corporation's long-term relationships, reputation and trademarks (Caves and Porter, 1977) . Finally, the corporate venture has strong marketing expertise and, through the parent corporation, knows its customers' needs.
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The flow of resources to the incubator from the parent can either occur top-down from the senior management, or be attracted internally from the bottom-up if the incubator manager has a highly autonomous position, or through external sources such as venture capitalists. Since capital for the corporate venture is often provided in a political budget process by senior management, corporate ventures may be strangled by bureaucratic whims such as tight budgetary control systems, shortterm quantitative targets and multiple review levels (Burgelman and Sayles, 1986 ). Access to time-sensitive resources can be delayed through bureaucratic decisionmaking (Kanter, 1989, p. 217) . Corporate ventures furthermore often receive little real corporate commitment in the form of continuous funding and reporting to senior management (Fast, 1981; Lerner, 2000, p. 445) . New senior managers, who often terminate their predecessor's "pet projects", also threaten venture programmes' continuity. "The typical corporate venture capital program has been terminated within four years of being launched." (Gompers and Lerner, 2001, p. 145) . Future research thus needs to distinguish between successful and unsuccessful corporate venturing programmes linked to the parent corporation's financial or strategic goals.
Resource flow between the corporate incubator and technology venture
The corporate incubator can support external or internal entrepreneurs who pursue opportunities despite their resource constraints (Stevenson and Jarillo, 1990; Timmons, 1999) . Financing, infrastructure, consulting and networks are major components of the provided incubation services (Achtleitner and Engel, 2001a) [See for other grouping of provided services such as shared services, assistance and financing (Allen and Rahman, 1985; Schroeder, 1990; Westhead and Batstone, 1999; European Commission, 2002) ].
Once technology ventures have been selected for the incubator, the interaction between the incubator manager and technology venture determines the resource flows' scope during their involvement (MacMillan et al., 1986; Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988; Rice, 1993; Rice and Abetti, 1993) . The incubator's quality and output may vary in the "co-production dyad", with the incubator as producer of business assistance and the entrepreneurs as consumers or receiver of resources (Rice, 2002) . The incubator manager is a resource broker providing networking, counselling, emotional support and expertise to the new ventures (Smilor and Gill, 1986; Rice and Abetti, 1992) . Proactive management by the incubator manager supports knowledge dissemination to the technology venture through counselling and the transfer of business skills and advice (Dierdonck et al., 1991; Westhead and Batstone, 1999) .
While incubator managers stress the importance of physical goods, the CEO, employees and auditors of technology ventures tend to place greater value on intangible skills passed on through physical co-location. Start-ups might benefit from the incubator by deriving credibility through its affiliation in terms of creating contacts with potential industry experts, customers, and suppliers to accelerate business building. By examining the impact of the incubator manager responsible for the day-to-day support on resident start-ups in high-technology incubators, Seidel (2001) found four intangible resources to be most beneficial for the entrepreneur: a network of contacts, the incubator manager's CEO expertise, regular performance feedback and benchmarking against other entrepreneurs, and the signalling effect through incubator affiliation. Conversely, however, potential business partners and investors might perceive affiliation as a crutch that strong entrepreneurs with extensive own networks need not rely on. Nevertheless, social networks' importance for entrepreneurs has been widely examined and accepted (Birley, 1985; Aldrich and Dubini, 1991; Hansen, 1995; Ostgaard and Birley, 1996) . The incubator is able to extend the new venture's entrepreneurial network to potential customers, suppliers and service contractors (Rice, 2002) , thus extending the social networks.
With the rise of for-profit independent incubators during the Internet boom, networks seemed to be one of the most important factors for new ventures in the e-commerce economy, as was found in a comprehensive worldwide survey by Hansen, Berger and Nohria. Termed "network incubators", they created high value by providing access to potential customers, suppliers and service providers (Hansen et al., 2000a, b) ; similar findings were derived for Germany during the same period by Achtleitner and Engel (2001b) . However, with the bust of independent incubators during the following economic slowdown, networks were proven to be not a long-term indicator of the creation of real volume and, thus, revenues.
Besides being used for building business, networks can also be important for quality control and to enhance own capacity by means of external service providers. If the incubator itself cannot provide the missing resources and knowledge, it takes on the role of a gatekeeper or network spider in coordinating third-party services (Colombo and Delmastro, 2002) . Smilor and Gill (1986) introduced the concept of an incubator "know-how network", which includes technical experts, marketing experts, intellectual property lawyers, accountants, potential debt or equity investors and other types of consultants or service specialists.
Research methodology
Our research focuses on how large technology-driven corporations with substantial R&D units can derive competitive advantage by supporting the management of their technology through the use of corporate incubators. The research question is how corporations organise their internal resource flow between the corporate incubator and the parent corporation to hatch internal and external new ventures for technology development acceleration. Our unit of analysis is the corporate incubator's 27 relationship and interaction with the parent corporation as well as with the technology venture in the form of the resource flow. This paper excludes the resource flow from external parties such as suppliers, competitors or service providers (e.g. consultants, legal providers, accountants and outside investors). External financing through public funding (e.g. federal laboratory or government agencies) or private funding (e.g. venture capitalists or angel investors) can, however, reduce the investment risk through diversification.
Towards a Resource-Based View of Corporate Incubators
The research was carried out in two phases:
Phase 1 (2001) (2002) : As part of an exploratory field research, a qualitative approach was undertaken through in-depth case studies (Yin, 1994) of 22 large European and American technology-intensive corporations' corporate incubators (see Table 1 for details). The research was based on 47 semi-structured interviews in 2001 and 2002 with the managers of corporate incubators of corporations with operations in high-tech industries such as computers, electronics and communications equipment manufacturing. For increased reliability, data were collected and analysed through multiple sources of evidence, such as archival records, company profiles, company records, company presentations, annual reports, press releases, and articles, as well as through our own observations (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994) . As far as the regional distribution of our sample is concerned, 15 case studies are from U.S.-based technology-intensive companies and seven from European-based companies. The criteria used for selecting the specific corporate incubators for case studies included their business-to-business concentration, headquarters in Europe or the U.S., their focus on high-tech industries as reflected in a high degree of R&D intensity and the sales generated from products less than 3 years old. These criteria stress the importance of supporting young enterprises or start-up ideas through special programmes, including the provision of physical resources. The majority of the corporate incubators surveyed were set up between 1998 and 2000 and at the time of writing approximately two-thirds were still operational. Since corporate incubators use different names, such as incubator, accelerator, business innovation and venture fund, they were included in the study if their strategic mission dealt with hatching young enterprises for technology development.
Phase 2 (2002) (2003) : The first findings regarding the resource flow between the parent corporation, corporate incubator and technology venture were extended by collecting quantitative data in two ways. First, the European Commission's database (European Commission, 2002 ) of more than 800 European incubators dispersed throughout the 15 EU member states, EEA countries (Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein), Switzerland and the 13 candidate EU countries was utilised and, secondly, the European Commission's primary data analysis of a benchmarking survey of European incubator managers (n = 77). The questionnaire encompassed key success factors in setting up and operating incubators, the support services' nature and scope, the incubator managers' key functions, the evaluation of the incubator services and the impacts from the receiving end.
Resource Flow from and to the Corporate Incubator Distinguishing between the resource of corporate incubators
The resource flow to and from the corporate incubator was analysed regarding the kind of resources, as well as the resource sources.
From the wide range of resource classification, the kind of resource can be described as being either tangible or intangible, reflecting the extent of its flexibility in respect of change (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991) . Tangible resources include financing, physical space, infrastructure and production facilities, while
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intangible resources that do not appear on the corporation's balance sheet and are harder to measure, include management know-how, organisational skills and culture, reputation or brand name, and customer networks. Since intangible resources are harder to detect, change or imitate by competitors, they are harder to measure and have often been neglected in the past.
We developed a model of resources distinction for corporate incubators (see Fig. 3 ). Tangible resources comprise a financial, physical and tangible knowledge flow, while intangible knowledge is passed on through physical co-location and branding. Knowledge flow integrates two aspects -a tangible part with physical elements, such as the use of databases or patents, and intangible knowledge such as advice and coaching and contacts. The intangible knowledge flow is particularly comprehensive, since it involves interaction and coordination inside the corporation as well as with outside networks, but is often hard to detect. Intangible resources furthermore create an iceberg effect under the surface. They are not immediately visible, but a project can fail if it is not conscious of the intangible flow.
There are three sources of resources: The corporate incubator can use its own resources, enhance its resources by leveraging the parent corporation or tap external resources outside the corporation. Resources from the parent corporation can come from central R&D, central support functions such as the HR or legal offices, market units with specific market knowledge, or key customer contacts. 30 O. Gassmann & B. Becker In the following sections two sources of resources are described in detail: The resource flow between the corporate incubator and parent corporation, and the resource flow between the corporate incubator and the technology venture.
Managing the resource flow between the corporate incubator and the parent corporation
One of the greatest strengths of the corporate incubator is its close link to the parent corporation, particularly with corporate specialists such as patent lawyers, technology experts and corporate customers. Internal resources flow continuously from the parent to the corporate incubator, defining the organisational boundaries of the firm internally, excluding alliances, joint ventures or supply partnerships as well as external resource flow-back to outside investors such as venture capitalists. Three stages can be distinguished: setting-up the corporate incubator with the transfer of capital, space and personnel, the incubation operation itself and the closing of the incubator. Besides the initial resource allocation to the incubator during its set-up, the incubator's own resources are enhanced by continuous access to the parent's resources during the incubator's operation. During operation, the corporate incubator might benefit from other parent core resource units, such as laboratories, as well as shared service units, like legal, personnel and market research. Through positive "network externalities" with the parent company, the corporate incubator can increase its access to the parent's resources outside the incubator itself, such as its financial and human resources, reputation and networks with potential.
Understanding of the interaction and resource flow between corporate incubator and parent corporation is still limited and must be researched further. While the transfer of tangible resources is easily visible, the exchange of intangible resources is less defined. It might, however, be even more important, since this is where the incubator acts as a knowledge broker between the parent corporation and the technology ventures (Fernandez et al., 2000) . In a continuing relationship, the corporation supports the incubator by providing advice, networking and marketing support and by sharing R&D laboratory facilities and pilot production facilities. Patents are transferred non-exclusively from the parent through the incubator to their destination, the technology venture, licensing patents internally to the incubator's technology ventures.
Motorola Ventures was set up in 1998 with four core offices (Boston, San Francisco, Tel Aviv and Latin America) to invest in technologies that would strategically support its existing and emerging platforms and products. In order to fulfil its strategic mission, it has access to the following corporate resources that it forwards to its technology ventures: Any number of relationships at any number of business units (access to its 35,000 engineers with adequate technical support), joint development, software competencies, distribution opportunities (e.g., access to carriers), volume sales discounts; transfer of non-core patents from the parent, or the discounted licensing of intellectual properties' fees, brand name and business relations. Nevertheless, Motorola Ventures allows new technology ventures to freely compete with the parent company by not enforcing exclusivity agreements.
The corporate incubator can coordinate its formal interface with the parent corporation through explicitly defined contact persons within the parent organisation. Mentors can help to access corporate resources more swiftly, increase commitment and control. These interface agents in corporate services, such as R&D, legal and finance or market-near business units, are all part of a predefined process of advice to optimise the incubation process. Moreover, the predetermined structure enhances corporate incubator's effectiveness.
For example, BT Brightstar, British Telecom's incubator for the corporate R&D unit BT Exact, relies on a mentorship model to find promising technologies and patents for which to create a business plan. In the end, this plan is financed through external partnerships with institutional venture capitalists. Endorsement of employees' ideas, rather than management encouragement, leads to the creation of business plans supported and coached by internal mentors. Similarly, Siemens Mobile Acceleration has appointed contact persons in the corporate centre and major business units to standardise the process of support that the technology venture receives from its parent corporation. A godfather or mentoring programme ensures a close link and fit with the Siemens Mobile portfolio. If the incubator manager and its staff need to tap further parent corporation information or networks, the defined communication channels help to reduce search time as well as to ensure commitment and support from the parent corporation. If a technology venture is spun-off at the end of its incubation, corporate finance and market business units might help to establish potential buyers for a trade sale or acquisition.
Resources also flow from the incubator back to its parent, in particular during the harvesting phase at the end of the incubation process. Harvesting successful new ventures' proceeds comprises flows of tangible technological and financial returns to the parent as well as intangible resources. Intangible benefits can include an increase in external prestige, relief from organisational pressure through expansion into new technology and market areas, alternative career paths for innovators and "intrapreneurs", opportunity for staff sabbaticals by accepting line management in the incubator and executive development through venturing activities. Through their different sizes, the corporate incubator and its technology ventures can also provide the parent organisation with alternative channels to partner external firms that might otherwise be competitors.
For example, Panasonic Digital Concepts Center with its Panasonic Internet Incubator in Cupertino and San Francisco, California, gives this Japanese electronic company visibility and access to technologies and players in Silicon Valley; it also offers the possibility of partnering other firms in the Silicon Valley venture community.
By analysing the knowledge flow, lessons learned from technology ventures' incubation process can be transferred back to the parent, particularly through R&D or market units. The corporate incubator can act as a knowledge broker to improve the explicit and tacit knowledge, because individual experts, acting as gatekeepers or promoters in the incubator, might be aware of who knows what within the organisation and thus support the knowledge flow with the parent (Allen and Cooney, 1971; Tushman and Scanlan, 1981; Hauschildt and Chakrabarti, 1988) . Furthermore, the incubator itself, as a semi-autonomous facet of the organisation, can play a formal or informal gatekeeper role. The incubator's informal organic structure, with little formalisation and extensive contacts with knowledgeable experts throughout the corporation, behaves like a "spider's web", supporting the transfer of knowledge (Miles and Snow, 1986) . The corporate incubator can support knowledge sharing between the R&D and different business units and can transfer experience and knowledge on how to support venturing activities and technology between the research and market units. This decreases venturing costs and realises economies of scale.
After a successful incubation process, the "graduated" technology ventures can be incorporated into the parent organisation, or spun-in into existing core businesses, or into a newly established business unit. An example of the support of knowledge transfer is provided by Nokia Ventures Organization. It grants managers the mobility to encourage a steady flow of information within the corporation. Employees from the business units can move into the incubator for a limited time to support their idea's realisation before they return to their respective business units. Nokia focuses on a close link between the technology venture and its business lines, as is reflected in the preferred exists of spin-ins to existing business units, or the forming of new Nokia business units.
Corporate incubation requires long-term corporate commitment by senior management to ensure the stability of the resource flow, as had already been stressed in the case of corporate venturing activities. Once a corporation commits resources through the design and set-up of a corporate incubator, the operation itself requires a lead-time of ideally 5-7 years to receive tangible and intangible returns. Roberts already pointed out the long-term perspective, which he called the "long-term persistence" (Roberts, 1980) . However, before the benefits of corporate incubation can materialise, the programme is often changed or even eliminated. Thus senior management plays an important role in the authorisation and commitment to resource transfer to the incubator and continuous mentorship. The corporate incubator's existence is not only linked to its own success, but also closely connected to the corporation's well-being due to its interwoven resources. Any change within the corporation, such as a new senior management, mergers or financial drain, can all unfold as either opportunities for or threats to the corporate incubator.
An example of how the appointed new senior management can change the strategic focus of the corporation and, therefore, end the resource flow to its incubator, is Bertelsmann Valley. In April 2001, Bertelsmann AG, the media conglomerate with its headquarters in Guetersloh, Germany, combined all of its venture activities into one unit called Bertelsmann Capital Ventures (BCV). The wholly owned subsidiary of Bertelsmann AG had the mission to develop external technology-driven multimedia companies that could expand and complement Bertelsmann's core business. Its incubator had access to the comprehensive resources of a global network of internal brands and sub-companies as well as Bertelsmann's customer base. In January 2002, it merged with Bertelsmann Valley, a division of Bertelsmann Multimedia GmbH, which incubated external start-ups that had been sourced through universities and trade fairs. Despite its proven incubation record of providing market access for Bertelsmann core businesses, Bertelsmann Capital Ventures was terminated after July 2002 with the departure of former CEO Thomas Middelhoff.
Even financial success is no guarantee of the corporate incubator's continuation, as was proved in the case of Lucent New Ventures (LNV). Formed in 1997 to spin-out internal non-core technologies developed in its Bell Labs, and, later, to spin-in technologies complementing its own product line, it achieved extraordinary financial and strategic success. In 2001, tensions arose between the successful incubator and the parent's declining fortunes, because the incubator managers received a high remuneration due to their 50 percent annualised internal rate of return through equity gains, particularly from three re-acquisitions, while company bonuses were frozen. Lucent's financial woes coincided with organisational restructuring, and the sale of their incubator's 80 percent majority share to Coller Capital, a London-based equity management company, to preserve cash reserves.
Corporate incubators with early high-return successes increase their chances of having sufficient political capital to survive an internal corporate shake-up. Building a positive internal reputation can enhance internal support for a continuous and stable resource flow from the parent to the corporate incubator. While the transfer of tangible resources has been recognised as important, intangible skills passed on through physical co-location has only recently received greater appreciation and management awareness.
Managing the resource flow between the corporate incubator and technology venture
Once the corporate incubator is established and equipped with resources from the parent, tangible and intangible resources are transferred to various technology ventures. The resource type and the scope thereof determine the incubator's "product", and the provision of management assistance to accelerate the development of technology ventures. The four-stage process of incubation (selection, structuring, involvement and exit) helps to describe the resource flow as derived from the venture capital literature (Gompers and Lerner, 2001a, b) . Based on the corporation's strategic and financial goals, corporate incubators decide what kind of technology ventures they want to attract and select in the selection phase. Once the technology venture has been selected, the structuring stage involves deciding how the technology venture will pay for the resources and services it receives, which is usually through equity stakes or service charges. The longest incubation process phase is the involvement stage when technology ventures receive most of their resources from the corporate incubator. During the final incubation stage, exit from the technology venture, corporate incubators follow developed exit criteria, such as milestones reached or closing due to unachieved objectives.
In the subsequent paragraphs we describe the (a) provision of tangible and intangible resources from the parent to technology ventures during the involvement phase, (b) their secondary effects on the technology venture itself as well as (c) the resource flow from technology ventures back to the incubator.
The best known example of the transfer of tangible and intangible resources from the corporate incubator to the technology venture can be found at Cisco New Ventures that defined similar resource flows to their technology ventures. In one of their start-ups, Ardent Communication Ventures, the business idea for a traffic aggregation device for data and voice originally came from a Cisco employee who had already made plans to leave the corporation to start his own venture. Cisco first supported the start-up through investment and other resource flows before its later spin-in. In June 1996, Cisco's initial investment comprised an equity stake of 32 percent with a put/call option requiring Cisco to purchase the start-up if the team was successful within 15 months. Further support of the start-up included the licensing of its software and gratis access to Cisco's testing and certification facility. Intangible resources included the provision of engineering consulting services for a standard fee, which temporarily assigned Cisco's engineers to the start-up to accommodate their needs and speed up business growth. A positive impact of the close connection with the parent was that Ardent Communication Ventures could define product specifications in line with Cisco's requirements. This enhanced the internal use of the device as well as leveraging Cisco's customers. In June 1997, Cisco spun-in the start-up for $232.5 million -3 months before the put/call option expired. The mutually defined technology standard accelerated the new technology venture's technological integration into the parent. Furthermore, Cisco's coordination of Ardent's marketing programme avoided the need to re-educate their customers after the spin-in.
Our analysis of the EU survey data points to the importance of resources for both for-profit incubators, which include corporate incubators, as well as non-profit incubators. Important tangible resources entail the provision of financials such as funding and tangible knowledge, including accounting, legal and marketing research, and human resource advice such as transfer of an incubator's personnel (Fig. 4) . Intangible knowledge entails support in writing business plans for start-ups' formation, networking opportunities and contacts to various of the parent's business units, customers and service providers, and support to appoint the technology venture's board and establish business partners for common development and service. The credibility that technology ventures derive from affiliation with an incubator is important in terms of creating contacts with potential industry experts, customers and suppliers, who provide feedback regarding market needs.
In the study, 76.6 percent of for-profit incubator managers reported that raising financing from banks, venture capital corporations or grants is the most important in-house service in respect of tangible resources. Interestingly, the incubator's provision of seed funding is mentioned by only 23.5 percent of for-profit incubators, with this having a higher priority for non-profit incubators. In respect of human resource advice there is no significant difference between for-profit and non-profit incubators.
Incubator managers find the incubator's provision of intangible resources to the technology venture very important. For example, 88.2 percent of for-profit incubator managers ranked forming a company as the most important service provided to their technology ventures, 82.4 percent cited pre-incubation and 64.7 percent mentioned networking with entrepreneurs and potential customers. The latter is surprisingly smaller than for non-profit incubators, 86.7 percent of which mentioned networking services. The second most important service provided is the development of new products (52.9 percent).
Overall, corporate incubators as well as non-profit incubators offer only routine support services such as minimal accounting, bookkeeping, tax work and filling out routine legal forms, but refer technology ventures to outside expertise when this is deemed necessary. For these more comprehensive requirements they rely on external affiliated firms such as accounting offices and local legal firms. Since corporate incubators' new ventures are new business for the corporation, they tend to be more complicated and are consequently more likely to need outside expertise than non-profit incubators do. Corporate incubators' staff is therefore more likely to make regular use of external intangible resources.
The incubator management team, comprising the incubator manager and his staff, largely determine the quality of the intangible resources provided to the technology venture. In his seminal paper, Von Hippel (1977) had already found access to incubator personnel an important determinant of a venture's relative success. He ascertained that both the technology venture team's educational background and the venture manager's previous organisational experience are key success factors for technology ventures.
Interestingly, the background of for-profit and non-profit incubator managers does not differ substantially. There are two exceptions: more for-profit incubator managers have a real estate or property management background (29.4 percent for for-profit contrasting with 11.7 percent for non-profit incubators), while twice as many of non-profit incubators' staff come from a personnel management or an education background (45 percent).
The incubator manager and incubator staff's qualifications are determined by their industry background, as already described, as well as by their educational background and experience. Staff of for-profit incubators have more background in training relevant to business incubation (45.5 percent with more than 4 years' experience), advising start-ups or small companies (25 percent) and managing their own companies (23.1 percent). An incubator manager's number of qualifications correlates with the number of staff who participated in training to enhance incubation know-how during the previous 12 months (0.254 with P < 0.05). A qualified incubator manager looks after his staff and provides them with relevant training, although incubator managers' qualification correlates with the number of staff who has managed their own companies or worked in business (0.266 with P < 0.05). A qualified incubator manager can therefore attract more qualified staff with business backgrounds. Along these lines, the number of staff who managed their own companies or worked in business is negatively correlated to the number of external services (−0.214 with P < 0.001). An incubator with more qualified staff thus requires a smaller number of external services, since the incubator can offer them internally.
While the above discussion has described the main resource flow from the incubator to the technology venture, on a limited scale, resources also flow back to the incubator from its portfolio companies. Through cooperation with innovative technology ventures, outstanding employees can be selected and transferred from the technology venture to the parent organisation for special tasks. To a lesser extent, technology ventures' founders and key employees can be recognised and retained through new ventures being spun-in, as happens at Cisco New Ventures. Rather than simply evaluating its current physical assets, Cisco evaluates the technology venture's intellectual assets, since they represent the management team and engineers who will determine the next generation of products. To avoid the danger of key researchers' transfer to other corporations during or after the spin-in, Cisco New Ventures manages human resource services actively through stock participation, bonus packages and the definition of new responsibilities and career paths.
Discussion
There is no single definition of corporate incubators as alternative for-profit sources of technology advancement for corporations in the incubator world. An incubator could be formed as a joint venture, or an industry-wide venture, with more than one corporate parent. Furthermore, the model presented here with its three actors -the parent organisation, corporate incubator and the technology venture -and its twostage process of early set-up and harvest phase during the incubator's involvement, is still far from an accurate reflection of reality. A description of resource flows can be further enhanced by including all potential exchanges between the three players as well as their networks, i.e. the resource flow from -the parent company to the corporate incubator, to the technology ventures; -the parent company's network to the corporate incubator, to the technology ventures;
38 O. Gassmann & B. Becker -the corporate incubator to the technology ventures; -the corporate incubator's network to the technology ventures; -the technology ventures to the corporate incubator, to the incubator's network affiliates, to the parent company, to the parent company's affiliates; as well as from -the technology venture's network to the corporate incubator, to the parent company, to the technology ventures.
There are also additional, many-to-many linkages between each principal party's affiliates, but those are indirect effects as far as this set of relationships is concerned. Based on interviews in the case studies, we hypothesise in respect of the scope and importance of the resource flow to technology ventures that the (Table 2) : -financial flow from the parent corporation is particularly strong. -physical flow from the corporate incubator is strong. -tangible knowledge flow from both the incubator as well as the parent is strong. -intangible knowledge flow from the incubator is strong.
-branding from the parent is strong.
The corporate incubator is mainly associated with a physical resource flow. However, tangible and intangible knowledge flows play an important role in accelerating technology development. Furthermore, the neglected external flow of resources provides an explanation for the exogenous residual variances unexplained in the model.
As far as the management of the resource flow between the corporate incubator and parent corporation is concerned, issues regarding the scope of the autonomy and organisational design arise. The corporate incubator depends on a continuous resource flow from the parent, competing with other business groups and subunits for limited resources such as personnel, capital and time. Middle managers who allocate resources to the incubator often choose projects with the highest likelihood of success and low risk. On the other hand, a corporate incubator is often set up to develop something new in respect of technology and markets that the parent corporation cannot do. This requires moving away from the corporation's rules and location as well as from the "emotional equity of the past" (Hamel, 1999) . Thus, the scope of the corporate incubator's autonomy needs to be determined to ensure a continuous resource flow. Aligning the incubator's goals with those of the parent corporation as well as strong networking support projects of strategic importance to the corporation could ensure its long-term existence. If the separation is too great, problems of exchange and communication might occur as was witnessed when Xerox failed to maintain contact with its incubator PARC.
Strategic importance and operational relatedness determine the corporate incubator's organisational design. If the corporate incubator is positioned near the corporate centre, its direct integration reflects its high strategic importance. Being less crucial for the corporation, it can be organised as a semi-autonomous unit with the potential to be spun-out. In this case, more resources might initially flow to the incubator to increase the level of independence needed to operate as a profit centre. Where the corporate incubator is part of a central or business unit R&D, it might have less of its own resources but a stronger network to resources from the central R&D and other support units.
The quality of the exchange between the corporate incubator and technology venture depends on the scope and quality of resources, the resource allocation process, their physical proximity and resource absorption.
The traditional resource allocation process could be augmented with resource attraction, or a bottom-up approach, especially in the early venturing phase. Projects should receive funding through an internal competition of ideas based on merit, and not on past history or relationships. This self-selecting process creates dynamic internal markets for ideas, capital and talent. Some degree of resource distribution from the bottom-up allows a flexible distribution of resources on a need basis, including changes to other projects or units, exit from a technology venture, or project extension after the project assessment. In this case, communicating through stories and obtaining additional bottom-up information enable market signals and extend traditional financial performance measures, such as net present value and discounted cash flow.
It is unclear whether the incubator's physical proximity to its technology ventures supports the resource flow and thus their performance. Venture capitalists and angel investors stress the old concept of physical proximity as a success factor, commenting, "If we can't drive to it, we don't lend to it". Allen (1970) found physical proximity to determine the scope of potential interaction describing the corporation and communication in R&D units. Nearby units, however, increase accessibility to key people, i.e. how easily they can be approached for advice. The physical proximity to different business units helps the new technology venture to receive casual support "from someone near the water cooler". Some incubators, such as Siemens Technology Accelerator, do not relocate entrepreneurs to the incubator; they rather leave them in their original business units. Others, such as Bell Labs' discovery team, Lucent New Ventures Group, demand relocation in order to have more interaction with the centrally located technology venture. Lucent's scientists are additionally motivated by an incentive system through which they receive phantom stock options for the technology venture's potential gains on top of their normal compensation package.
On the other hand, while globalisation increases the geographically dispersion of corporations, they are supported by cheap technical advancements such as webbased communication, e-mail and videoconferencing tools. Virtual incubators, in other words, incubators "without walls", have developed, tending to defy the importance of physical proximity that was so effective in the 1970s. Reliability and the quality of information are other key factors that can be enhanced by the appropriate incentive system.
Once resources are placed at technology ventures' disposal, questions regarding the resource absorption arise. Due to its resource constraints, the technology venture often welcomes physical resources such as money and infrastructure. Intangible resources such as contact leads, consulting, coaching, or even advice, though highly desirable, can be harder to absorb. Absorption might also be limited due to cultural incompatibility if the technology ventures are not aligned with the corporate incubator and the parent corporation's values. Trust and commitment are other factors influencing the degree of readiness to receive the provided resources. The corporate incubator's long-standing existence supports the establishment of deep-seated trust rather than a mere focus on short-term incubation performance.
Conclusion and Further Research
The main objective of this paper was to contribute to the understanding of the resource flow from and to the corporate incubator. Research needs to distinguish between the two fundamental business models of non-profit and for-profit incubators that support the development of new ventures. By distinguishing corporate incubators from independent for-profit incubators, the resource-based view offers a valuable framework for an analysis. It can determine what types of resources are transferred to technology ventures and how the incubator manager can measure and control the resource flow. To analyse the resource flow between the three players during incubation -parent organisation, corporate incubator and technology venture -a distinction between tangible and intangible resources is helpful, despite or even due to the various definitions of resources. While the focus was on the transfer of tangible resources in the past, intangible resources can often have a higher impact, despite being difficult to measure. The resource flow is a two-fold process of early set-up and the harvest phase. Furthermore, to understand the kind of resources provided, one should examine the resource flow between the corporate incubator and the parent corporation as well as between the corporate incubator and its technology ventures. Initially, the corporate incubator and the technology venture receive resources that they return in the form of financial profits but, even more importantly, which they return to the corporation through explicit and tacit knowledge.
Our exploratory study provides a first insight into a resource-based view of corporate incubators and invites further development and applications. Further research is needed in several areas.
An in-depth quantitative longitudinal study on the development of corporate incubators should be carried out measuring the performance outcomes of incubation by means of, for example, the number of successful new ventures or revenues generated. This should include a survey of technology ventures' success factors in respect of the type of resource flow, the sophistication of management knowhow, the extent of the networking quality and the effect of corporate branding on the growth of technology ventures. This can link the corporate incubator's mission with the type of incubator, owner (i.e. provider of capital for the incubator) and the incubator manager's characteristics.
The question of whether physical proximity might improve performance, needs to be examined further. This would concern the incubator's location in relation to the corporate parent as well as the distance between the incubator and its technology ventures and its scope of access.
Further research needs to analyse resource absorption. The question here is how the relationship between incubator manager and the technology venture affects the resource flow's scope and quality. A high degree of interaction and a long-term perspective, based on mutual trust and commitment, might specifically support the intangible resource flow and the reliability of the exchange.
The three-player model needs to be enhanced with internal as well as external partners and thus the role of networks regarding direct and indirect contributors to venture outcomes. Further networks included the ones from the parent company, the corporate incubator as well as the technology ventures.
Finally, it would be interesting to enhance the concept of gatekeepers in respect of whether it can be applied to hybrid organisations and not only individuals. Incubators could assume a formal or informal gatekeeper role to drive information flow and, thus, innovation.
